The term "embedding" is ill-def ined and has been ap plied to distinct phenomena, some predicted by economic theory and othe rs not. Th is paper lays out a theore tical framework for looking at these phe nome na and prov ides a se t of well-defined terms . Included is a discuss ion of survey des ign prob lems wh ich may induce spur ious evidence in favor of the hypothes is that responde nts are inse ns itive to the scope of the good being valued. An emp irical example of the compone nt se nsitivity is prov ided. This test rejects the hypothesis that responde nts are inse ns itive to the scope of the good being valued. !'.' 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
The issue of what effect, if any, a goad's placement in a valuation sequence should have on the goad's value has recently received a great deal of attention from those interested in environmental benefit and damage assessment. Much of this attention is due to the claim made by the authors of several recent papers on "embedding" experiments that the contingent valuation (CV) method consistently produces results which violate fundamental economic theory. 2 They interpret their experimental findings as showing that respondents are willing to pay the same amount for goods that differ in quantity and different amounts for identical goods valued under a variety of conditions which they argue should not influence the willingness-to-pay amounts.
On the basis of their comparisons, these researchers conclude that these effects are an inherent feature of the CV methodology, which renders it too unreliable for use in a benefit or damage assessment. However, close examination of these experiments raises questions about the nature of these theoretical violations and about the logical consistency of the concept "embedding effects," the term used to describe the range of phenomena under discussion. In addition, there is a plausible alternative explanation for some of the findings of these experiments which raises the question of whether the findings might be the result of poor survey design rather than evidence of an inherent flaw in the contingent valuation method.
Like many arguments in economics, the central feature of the embedding debate concerns a common sense empirical relationship economists expect to find in choice behavior. In particular, if an individual is confronted with two quantities of the same good, say A and B where A > B, and the good has strictly positive marginal utility, then the individual should be willing to pay more for A than for B. Further, if the quantity of A exceeds that of B by a substantial amount, economist's common sense would lead them to feel uncomfortable if the willingness to pay for A exceeded the willingness to pay for B by only a trivial amount.
We wish to accomplish four things in this paper. The first is to argue for limiting the use of the "embedding effect" to a narrow, well-defined phenomenon and to propose a new nomenclature to help clarify the terminological confusion caused by the use of "embedding" to describe a wide variety of nesting and sequencing issues. The second is to clarify which aspect of economic theory is tested in the various "embedding" comparisons which have appeared in the literature. The third is to describe how amenity misspecification biases may produce the "embed ding effects" in inadequately designed surveys. The fourth is to present the findings of an experiment conducted as part of a full-scale contingent valuation study which demonstrates that these effects are not inevitable, as some of the method's critics claim on the basis of some of the experiments described above. We conclude that the issues raised by the "embedding" critics need to be taken seriously in the design of valid CV surveys, but that the critics' dismissal of the method on the grounds that it assesses the value of public goods in a way that is "demonstrably arbitrary" [21, p. 58] is unwarranted.
DEFINING COMPARISONS
Consider two goods, a and b. If neither a nor b is a proper subset of the other, we will define the set {a, b} to be a set of conventional goods. If either a or b is a proper subset of the other we will define {a, b} to be a set of nested goods. 3 Henceforth, we will designate the elements of a set of conventional goods using lowercase letters {a, b} and the elements of a set of nested goods using capital letters {A, B}. The number of elements in a set of conventional goods, e.g., {a, b, c, d, e}, can, in principle, be increased to any desired number. It is usually also possible to increase the elements of a set of nested goods {A, B, C} by inclusion of a good which encompasses A or divides C in some fashion. While mixed sets, e.g. {A, B, g, k}, are obviously possible, we will not consider the economic relationships between the elements of such a set because they follow directly from those for a set of conventional or nested goods.
There are two types of nesting with respect to the scope of the goods. 4 The first way is for A and B to both be measured along some common scale so that A represents a larger value on that scale than does B. We will call this type 3 An examp le of a nested environmental good would be to le t A represent air quali ty imp rovements throughout California an d let B represent air quality improvements in Lo s Angeles. 4 To keep the notation simp le, we wi ll assume without loss of ge nerality that B is a prop er subset of A.
quantitative nesting. 5 The second way is for A to be composed of two objects, possibly sets, B and its complement B*, where neither B nor B* is an empty set and their intersection is empty. We will call this categorical nesting.6
The distinction between numerical and categorical nesting is a relative one. At one level of detail, everything becomes categorical. Indeed, quantitative nesting can always be treated as categorical nesting by treating increments of the good of interest as separate goods. At another level of detail, everything might be treated as numerical. The problems with many environmental commodities is that the types of distinctions that respondents perceive as meaningfully different are not known without doing substantial exploratory work. 7 A valuation sequence consists of a respondent valuing a set of goods in a particular order. We will denote the first good valued in a sequence with the superscript, 1, the next with the superscript 2, and so on, so that a valuation sequence might look like V(c1, a2, b3).8 For simplicity, we will consider only willingness-to-pay (WTP) sequences which maintain the initial level of utility: in a valuation sequence we will talk about a respondent's willingness to pay for a2 conditional on having already paid for the previous element c 1 , in the sequence. 9 Particularly with nested goods, it will be useful to define top-down valuation sequences, e. g., V(A1, B2, C3), and bottom-up valuation sequences, e.g., V(C1, B2, A3).
The elements of a set can be valued by a single respondent or by a subsample of respondents. 10 We will denote the first subsample being asked willingness-to-pay questions with the Roman numerical subscript I, the second with the subscript II, and so on, so that a valuation sequence for subsample II might look like V(c:1, af1, b f1).The summary statistic (e.g., median, mean) for a subsample's will ingness to pay for an arbitrary element in a valuation sequence will be noted WTP (xj) if it is a conventional good or WTP(Xj) if it is a nested good.
Consider three different valuation sequences V(a:, b�, ci), V(b)1, Cf1), and V(c:1 1 ) and possible comparisons between willingness to pay for different elements of those sequences. The graphical representation in Table 1 (for conventional   5 For example, A could be 20 days of imp roved visib ili ty and B imp roved visibili ty on 6 of the 20 days represented by A.
6 For example, A could be 20 days of improved visibility and raising the level of water quality in a ri ver basi n from fish able to swimm able qu ality while B 20 days of improved visibility.
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To assume, for example , that re sp onde nts in a city sh ould be willing to pay for ai r pollu tion control to achieve a change from an ave rage of 12 bad quali ty days a year to an average of 10 days a year assumes that the re spondents perceive this as improvement they care abou t; this may or may not be the case. Continge nt valuation su rveys rely on the re sponde nts perception of the scenario, and the re se archer has the re sp onsibility to clearly communicate the nature of the good to the responde nt, includi ng its nume rical and categori cal prop erties. 8V( · ) will be used to si mply denote the orde r in which a re sp onde nt is asked que stions abou t the valuation of particul ar goods. It will not be used to represe nt the values for the goo ds themselves. In the example Vic 1 , a 2 , b3), the re spondent was first asked abou t the value of good c, then abou t the value of good a, and then about the value of good b.
9 The concepts and notations set ou t here can al so be used for constant utility willingness to accept compensation se quences. The direction of income and substi tution effects in such a se quence will tend to be the opposi te effects of th ose in a willingness to pay se quence [7) . 10 For simplicity we will assume random assignment of re spondents to subsamples. Obviously, more complex statistical designs are possible. We will refer to subsamples rather th an individu al responde nts unless there is a need to make a distinction. Economic theory says little about the relationship between the elements of the three valuation sequences of conventional goods depicted in Table 1 without specifying more about the nature of those goods. It is reasonable to assume that most environmental goods are normal goods. It may also be reasonable to assume that the goods in the set of interest are all individual or, in groups, Hicksian substitutes for each other. 13 Under these conditions, it can be shown that two external tests of economic theory are possible:
(la) 11 It is possible to contract either of these tables by taking away a column and/or row or to exp and them by add ing columns and rows. Quantitative nesting, in principle, allows for the possibil ity of a continuum of rows and colum ns . Most of the tests put forward in literature can be easily represented as testing the differ ences between elements in on e of these two tabl es .
12 F or nonnested goods, there is an additional type of test based on the work of Hoehn and Randall [18) . Th e tot al value for a package of goods (but not the value of the indiv idual goods) sh ould be invariant to the order in which the indiv idu al goods ar e valued, e,g., V(a 1, b2, c 3 ) versus V(b1, a2, c 3 ). 13 Th ese two conditions guarantee that sequ encing effects run in the same direction. Th ere are of course situations of interest where they may not hold. For instance, some forms of recreation appear to be infer ior goods and some comb inations of env ironmental amenities may be compliments. Th e direction of the sequencing effect in such instances will depend on the absolute ma gnitudes of the individual effects.
and (lb )
Tests of the hypotheses represented by Eq. (la) and (lb) will be termed embedding effect tests. 14 If we make the fu rther assumption that the respondent would always get positive utility from possessing any of these goods regardless of whether the respondent already possesses any or all of the other goods at issue, the weak inequalities in (la) and (lb) can be replaced with strong inequalities. In general, economic theory does not say anything a priori about comparisons between different goods, e. g. , (bj, cj).
Predictions fr om Economic Theory: Nested Goods
Nested goods are a special case of conventional goods so that (la) and (lb) hold if we make the same assumptions. To get the strong inequality in the nested goods case, one must assume for (la) that respondents still get positive utility from B after they possess its complement B*, and for (lb) that respondents still get positive utility for C after they possess C*. Testing a null hypothesis of equality in an embedding effect test is essentially testing for consistency with a flat utility function with respect to further increases in the good e. g. , WTP (Bl) conditional on having B* is zero. Note although a flat utility function with respect to B or (C) conditional possessing B* (C*) might not be considered well behaved, it is not ruled out by economic theory, assuming local nonsatiation does rule out such behavior.
The nesting property also allows predictions about other possible comparisons to be made. Let us first look at the internal tests. Here, since we are using a top-down valuation sequence, it can be shown that It is important to note that the willingness-to-pay amounts for the goods in the 14 Kahneman and Knetsch [22] refer to th is type of test as a test of ''regu lar" emb eddi ng. They use the term "perf ect" em beddi ng if the goods involved are nested commodities.
top-down and bottom-up valuation sequences will, in general, not be the same. This is because of differences that respondents perceive in the available implied choice set (initially large or broad depending on the type of nesting in the top-down sequence, and initially small or narrow in the bottom-up sequence) and because of differences in whether the respondent believes he or she already possesses the complement of the good being valued (the top-down case) or has just purchased it (the bottom-up case).15 Equations (2a) and (2b) result follow from monotonicity assumptions. Again, the weak inequalities may be replaced by strong inequalities, if it is assumed that respondents get utility from the complement of the element being valued. Tests of the hypotheses represented by these equations will be called nested sequence tests.
Another comparison which can be made is along the diagonal of Table II :
We will term this comparison a test of component sensitivity. It looks at whether respondents are sensitive to differences in levels of the good (quantitative nesting) or the level of inclusion (categorical nesting) in a way that should change its value. Essentially, it is the external test version of Eq. (2) and has the same theoretical properties.
TESTING HYPOTHESES INVOLVING SEQUENCING AND NESTING
Early contingent valuation studies performed nested sequence tests of the hypotheses represented by Eq. (2) and routinely rejected the proposition that different levels of a good were valued equally. 1 6 There were two competing, although not necessarily contradictory, explanations for these results. The first was that contingent valuation surveys generally elicit responses which are consistent with well-behaved preferences. The second is that respondents simply strive to be internally consistent with the notion that more of something desirable is worth more.
Kahneman and Knetsch [2 1) contended that the behavior necessary to show that contingent valuation responses are valid was for equality constraints to hold in Eq. (1). This argument was in keeping with Kahneman and other's long-held notion that for contingent valuation to be useful, contingent valuation to be useful, contingent valuation responses should be largely context free. This notion was strongly rejected by resource economists conducting contingent valuation research as inconsistent with the notion of substitution effects and budget constraints 15 In the top-down sequence, the respo ndent is asked an allocation ques tio n which, to be well defined, asks how much less A is worth if it does not include B. Th at is the respondent alr eady presumes th at he or she has possession of A by virtue of having said how much he or she would pay for it and th en is as ked what portio n of the purchase price for A is for B. In the bottom-up sequ ence, the respo ndent would have alr eady purchased B and then is ess entially as ked how much B* is now worth .
Bo ttom-up sequences have been frequently used by contingent valu ation research to value a series of improvements to an existing enviro nm ental good. Th ey are generally better defined than top-down sequences .
16 See for instance, Brooksh ire et al.
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(3, [16] [17] [18] .' 7 These economists consider the size and nature of the choice set to be important fa ctors in determining a respondent's value to a particular good and believe that sequencing effects, in general, should be expected. Indeed, some thought that such effects might be sizeable even in common situations.1 8 In general, those doing applied contingent valuation research followed the practice of the vast majority of applied benefit-cost studies by treating the change in the good of interest as the only change to the status quo. If the agency was going to undertake related projects, researchers would sometimes suggest that an examina tion of the "package" might be warranted. Kahneman and Knetsch (21, 22] , noting this admission, argued that since the choice of a valuation sequence is arbitrary, estimates from a contingent valuation study are arbitrary. This argument was sooner taken up by other CV critics, some of whom took the position that respondents should be allowed to change the level of consumption of all public goods. 19 There are two problems with this argument.
The first is a theoretical point not specific to contingent valuation; Carson et al [7] and Randall and Hoehn (31] have shown that the value of any particular public good generally has to become progressively smaller as it is placed deeper and deeper in a willingness-to-pay sequence. They also show that the opposite is true in the case of a willingness-to-accept sequence. The second is a practical empirical issue specific to contingent valuation: as one tries to value more and more goods in a single survey instrument, the description of each of the goods necessarily becomes so brief as to convey only a vague notion to respondents of the nature of the good to be provided and the method and manner in which it would be provided, violations of good CV practice.
Even assuming agreement on a small set of goods, testing the hypotheses represented by Eq. ( 1) poses two substantive problems. The first is a fundamental 17 Whi le Kah neman and Knetsch (21] make som e ac knowledgment of the possible role of substitu tion and income effects, they claim , without presenting supporting evidence, that such effects sh ould be small and ignorable. The Di amond et al. (12] paper claims to fi nd no su bstitution effect in a wilderness example. However, Carson and Flores [6) show that Diamond et al. sh ould have reached the opposite conclusion-substitution effects were potenti ally large and not ignorable. Th ey also show , by simply regressing willingness to pay on the number of acr es in the wilderness area the respondent was asked to value. that the Diamond et al. claim to have demonstrated component insensitivity in th eir fi rst hypothesis test is incorrect .
18 It is fai rly straightforward to demonst rate that emb eddi ng effects must occu r ev en in demand sy st ems for common marketed commodities [31) . Large multiple-site travel cost models, which are som etimes used to estimate nonmarket use values, typically suggest very large embedding effects. A st ylized example based on the work of Ward and Fiore (37] involves filling water reservoirs around a large city in the southwestern United States. Th e water reservoi rs vary in size and in their location. Wh ichever reservoir is filled fi rst typical ly produces very large recreation benefits while whichev er reservoi r is filled last typically produc es quite small additional recreational benefit s. 19 For an emp irical example, see Kemp and Maxwell [23] who offered resp ondents to a sh opping-mall int ercept survey the op portunity to say how much extra they would pay in a federal income tax su rcharge to "help imp rove" a wide range of soci al problems which included "protecting th e envi ron men t." Using a top-dow n disaggregation procedure, resp ondents were next asked to break dow n, on a percentage basis, the portion of this am ou nt they wou ld pay for "protecting the environment" am on g nine categories of envi ronmental protection including "protecting wilderness areas and wildlife." Subsequ ent di saggregation allocated percentages among fou r major types of harm, and then am on g fi ve types of "human caused problems" and fi nally am ong U.S. coastli ne regi on s. After multiplying the original amount giv en fo r the envi ronment by the long st ring of percentage al locations, Kemp and Maxwell conclude that their resp ondents are willing to pay alm ost nothi ng to prevent an Exxon Valdez type oil spill in Alaska.
disagreement between economists and some cognitive psychologists over whether it is "good" or "bad" for contingent valuation to be able to reject the equality in (1) . The second is that testing Eq. (1) generally requires a top-down allocation question to get an estimate of WTP(Bl } and/or WTP(C;i ). The willingness-to-pay ques tions for the less inclusive goods using a top-down allocation framework typically present respondents with an ambiguous choice situation because the conditions under which these goods are to be provided are not well specified. As a result, different respondents will make different assumptions about those conditions and it is difficult to say what the responses to such questions represent.20
Implementation of Component Sensitivity Tests
Because of problems involved with the embedding effect test represented by Eq. (1) and with consistent acceptance of the theoretical restrictions represented by Eq. (2), attention has shifted to the component sensitivity test represented by Eq. (3) and its null hypothesis of component insensitivity. It is important because respondents to CV surveys should be sensitive to perceptually important differ ences in scope between two nested goods.21 It is feasible because the appropriate experimental design to test these diagonal relationships can be accommodated by surveys that value a single good; such surveys avoid the problems described above for multiple goods and make it possible to describe the good and its market in sufficient detail to successfully communicate the level of services that will be provided. 22 It is one thing to conduct component sensitivity experiments to assess the validity of a particular CV instrument; it is another to use them to assess the validity of the method. In the latter case researchers who fail to reject a component insensitivity hypothesis must be able to credibly argue that the result cannot be attributed to respondents actually not caring much about the difference between the goods, to poor instrument design, and administration or to a test that lacks sufficient power to reject plausible divergences from the null. 2 3 Because results that appear to violate economic theory (and common sense) can easily be induced in component sensitivity tests using inadequately designed CV surveys, at a 20 A dramatic but simplistic examp le using priv ate goods demonstr ates this concer n. Assume that our resp ondent's car coasts into the only gas station on a long stretch of desert road with a leaki ng radiator and out of gas. Ask the well-defined question, "How much are you willing to pay right now for fi xi ng the radiator and a tank of gas?" Now ask the alloc ation question, "How much of th at amount was for the tank of gas?" Th e respondent's answer shou ld depend on whether the gas station has already fi xed the radi ator and been paid; and, if not, whether the gas station can fix the radiator; and, if so, what the cost of fixing the radi ator is goi ng to be.
21 Th e Blue Ribbon Panel convened by NOAA identified embeddi ng [insensitivity to scop e] in this sense as a potentially "perhaps the most important internal argument against the reliab ility of th e CV approach" [l, p. 4607].
22 This test, with random assignment, also has the advantage of ensuring that the initial level of utility (i.e., income, perceived prices of private commodi ties, and perceived portfolio of pu blic goods) in the diff erent treatments are at least asymptotic ally equivalent, thus controlling one of the major factors which might be changing in an unobserved manner in the embeddi ng effect test of Eq. (1) . 23 This statement sh ould not be taken as saying anything about the general validi ty of contingent valuation as a valuation tech nique. Rather we are saying that befor e claiming that there is a problem with a measur em ent tool one sh ould determine how that tool was used.
minimum, component sensitivity tests of the CV method should do the following: 1. Use goods A, B and C, the differences between which are meaningful to respondents. 24 2. Conduct in-depth exploratory research to identify the relevant design issues, especially the types of amenity misspecification which may bias the findings. 2 5 3. Use the findings of this preliminary research to develop a description of each of the goods that respondents understand and a method of provision they find plausible.
4. Use a mode of survey administration that promotes respondent cooperation and attention during the interview process.
5. Use a sample of sufficiently large size that ensures that the hypothesis test has the power to reject reasonable differences of the magnitude.
SURVEY DESIGN ISSUES IN THE EMBEDDING DEBATE
From a survey perspective, the measurement issues raised by the "embedding" controversy involve a well recognized and potentially serious class of biases which we have elsewhere called amenity misspecifications [28) . Although these biases pose a methodological challenge to CV researchers and require careful attention in the design phase of a study, they are often avoidable if the scenario is plausible and the good is carefully described.
Among the amenity misspecification errors which are particularly relevant when testing hypotheses represented by Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) are symbolic, part-whole, metric, and probability of provision biases. 26 The presence of the first three biases tends to produce the appearance that people are insensitive to the characteristics of the good that they are asked to pay for. The last one can produce dramatic violations of economic theory by conveying the impression that people are willing to pay more for less. In what follows, we briefly describe the conditions which promote each type of bias and the implications for the "embedding" experiments conducted by the CV critics.
Symbolic bias occurs if respondents react to an amenity's general symbolic meaning instead of to specific levels of provision. It is promoted by scenarios in which respondents value relatively small changes, scenarios that use brief descrip tions of the good and the market, and studies that employ impersonal survey methods [28, p. 250) . Under these conditions respondents are likely to assume that 24 Meaningful di ffer ences between goods is of course a relative concept. Th e dis tinction is necess ary because th ere is nothi ng in economic theory that specifies which differences in the categoric al or quantitative features of goods should result in consumers' givi ng different willingness-to-pay amo unts fo r them. The reaso n th at nested goods are so suitable for this typ e of experiment is th at the direc tionality of the effect can be predicted fo r these goods ev en tho ugh the point where one good nested in the other sho uld begin to command a di ffer ent value cannot be predic ted wi th certainty. 25 Tolley et al. (35] provide an example of this typ e of exploratory research. Upon fi ndi ng th at their respondents were willi ng to pay almost as much fo r a dis tributio nal shift that improved visibili ty on 10 days as they were fo r visibility improv ements for an entire season, they revised th e scenario to present a much more thoro ugh presentatio n of the good. After do ing this and adm inis tering the survey to a new group of respondents they note: "the strikingly smaller bids for the modes t dis tributional changes, in contrast to the large bids obtained in the original surv ey, suggests th at the refined ques tio nnaire imparted a more careful understandi ng of the progr ams being co nsidered." 26 For a more detailed disc ussion of th ese biases see Mi tchell and Carson (28] .
the small damages described to them are symbolic for a good of greater magni tude; otherwise, why would anyone be taking the trouble to ask them to place a value on it.
Part-whole biases are the result of the willingness of respondents to answer questions even though the good itself may be vaguely described. In such instances, respondents fill in the details and make assumptions about the good that they think the interviewer has in mind. Vague descriptions are those which merely identify a good without specifying its important qualities and how it would be provided. Two examples from the study by Kahneman and Knetsch [21] are "provide protection for endangered birds" and "restore museums in the rural areas of British Columbia." Because these goods are vaguely defined and their provision implausible, 27 respondents are unlikely to make the effort necessary to give a considered value for their provision which takes into account all of the services they claim to provide (e. g., all endangered birds, all rural museums of all types). Put another way, ask a vague question and you are likely to get a vague, uninterpretable answer.
Metric bias occurs when the respondent values an amenity according to a metric different from the one intended by the researcher [28, p. 252] . Often this involves treating the numbers as ordinal instead of interval data. Another important metric consideration involves the baseline: do the 2000 dead birds belong to an endan gered species or to one that has more than half a million members living in the general area where the deaths occurred? Preventing metric bias requires under standing the relevant default assumptions a naive respondent is likely to hold about the relevant numbers and carefully framing the numerical information in the scenario to properly communicate its properties.
Probability of provision bias occurs when the perceived probability that the good will be provided differs from the researcher's intended probability. Most CV studies want the respondent to assume that the good will be provided with certainty. To the extent that respondents discount this, they will undervalue the good. The types of goods that are most vulnerable to this effect are those that involve large changes (e.g., 50% reduction of air pollution nationwide), or are vaguely defined, or are valued in a scenario which does not contain a plausible method of providing such a large improvement. 28 Under these conditions, probability of provision bias has the potential to cause people to appear to pay more for less, especially in combination with part-whole bias. For example, in one experiment Kahneman and Knetsch [2 1] found small that split samples were willing to pay $125 and $59, respectively, to "provide protection for the Peregrine Falcon, an endangered bird" and "provide protection for endangered birds." A possible reason that people were willing to pay less for the second, seemingly more inclusive good, is that they discounted the likelihood that protection of all endangered birds will be provided more than they discounted the likelihood of protecting a single named species. 27 For example, respondents were not provided information about which museums, what kinds of restoration, who would ensure that restoration took place, the time period over which restoration would take place, and the details of the payment scheme for the program.
28 In a series of experiments which presented subjects with brief CV-like scenarios. Fischhofff et al.
[13] found that larger goods were viewed as less likely to be provided than smaller goods and that the lower the likelihood of provision, the less people were willing to pay.
Amenity Misspecification Issues in Desvousges et al.
The methodological issue raised in the embedding debate is whether CV surveys can be designed so that they avoid or reduce these biases, i.e., whether these effects are inevitable. The CV critics [11, 12, 21] are confident that their experi ments show the latter. However, their position assumes that the findings of their experiments can be unequivocally attributed to a flawed methodology rather than their CV instrument and administration, an assumption that seems unwarranted when one looks closely at their studies. To illustrate this point, we discuss briefly some of the weaknesses of the Desvousges et al. [11] study which conducted two split-sample experiments using questionnaires that were self-administered by re spondents recruited by mall intercepts in Atlanta, Georgia.29
The Desvousges et al. first set of experiments found that respondents gave statistically similar WTP amounts in treatments which asked split samples to value preventing 2000, 10,000, and 200,000 birds from being killed by waste-oil holding ponds in the U.S. Central Flyway. While the difference in the number of birds killed appears dramatically large, this effect is diminished by other information in the scenario about the size of the total bird population that frames the loss in such a way that respondents could rationally perceive the three injury levels as relatively similar in scope.3° Further, no information was given about whether any of the species affected by the ponds were endangered, something that many respondents might plausibly have assumed since at least three of the five specifically mentioned in the scenario as affected-white fronted geese, snow geese, and greater sandhill cranes-would not be familiar to many Atlanta residents. Several aspects of their scenario are potentially implausible to their respondents. These include: (1) the idea that Atlantans would actually have to pay the amounts they said they were willing to pay for a good involving birds and waste-oil holding ponds located more than 1000 miles away from their house and (2) the idea that 250,000 waste-oil holding ponds were killing only 2000 or even 20,000 birds each year out of over 8 million passing over them. That such a large number of oil ponds would kill so few birds might have also encouraged some respondents to assume that the actual numbers stated in the survey were symbolic of more substantial injuries. In addition, it is unfortunate that the study did not ask debriefing questions to allow one to help evaluate whether respondents were sufficiently motivated to pay attention to the details of the scenario.31 29 For a more detailed discussion of serious desig n fl aws in the survey instruments used in another of the major embedding experiments, see the Smith (34) critique of Kahneman and Knetsch (21, 22) . 30 In the text of scenario, the responden ts ar e told that there are 8.5 millio n migratory waterfowl in the central flyway and that the number of birds whose deaths would be prevented amount to: "much less than 1 % (for the 2000-bird scenario), "less than 1 %" (20,000) and "about 2 percent" (200,000) of total birds . Desvousges et al. fi nd equivalen t medians for each of these three treatments ($25), al though the study's estim ated mean value for the 2 and 1 % scenarios were 71 and $59, resp ectively. Th eir experim ent lacked sufficient power to detect differences of this magnitude. The second set of experiments reported by Desvousges et al. asked one split sample to value reducing the environmental effects of oil spills of less than 50 , 000 gallons and the other to value preventing all spills, including those under and over 50 , 000 gallons. Respondents expressed similar levels of value for the two levels of prevention which Desvousges et al. contend represent large differences that should have elicited different size WTP amounts. The first problem with this survey instrument is that its scenario does not clearly describe the aggregate amount of environmental injury that would be prevented by each program. 32 The second design problem is the complexity of the description of how the program would work, which obscures the difference between the two goods.33 and uncertainty about whether the good will be provided.34 These design problems raise questions about the nature of the injury that respondents were asked to value and may well have increased the prospect for part-whole biases.
A NEW TEST OF THE COMPONENT INSENSITIVITY HYPOTHESIS
The component insensitivity hypothesis has been tested in some fashion in a number of other CV studies conducted for other purposes, including several in which we have been involved. In the first of these, Mitchell and Carson [27] tested whether respondents valued different levels of risk reduction with respect to trihalomethane (THM), a common drinking water contaminant, using random assignment and a split-sample approach. We found significant differences in the three comparisons made. In Mitchell et al. [29] , using a similar approach, we tested whether respondents valued air quality programs which provided health and visibility benefits significantly more than programs which provided only health benefits and found that they did. In Carson and Mitchell [8] , again using a split-sample approach, we tested whether respondents were willing to pay different amounts to prevent residential water shortages in California of different severities and frequencies. We found the amounts for the four programs asked about to be significantly different from each other. We have also carried out a comparison [9] which looked at willingness to pay for improvements in national water quality versus a particular large river system from two independent studies which used very similar survey instruments except for the exact scope of the good. We strongly rejected that the willingness to pay estimates were the same. Carson and Mitchell [10] discuss these tests in more detail.
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Two pages before the valuation question, respondents are told that "The damage from spills of less than 50,000 gallons is usually limited to sea birds and shoreline habitats in the immediate vicinity of the spill. Large off shore spills may cover miles of shoreline, contaminate shellfish beds, and kill thousands of seabirds and some marine mammals." Missing from this description are several types of information which respondents would need to determine the value of preventing such a spill to them. These include the types and endangered status of the birds, the number of miles of shoreline, whether the effect on shellfish poses possible harm to humans, and the number of types of marine mammals at risk.
33 Both subsamples were told that 95% of oil spills are less than 50,000 gallons and that the remainder are the few very large spills that can exceed 1,000,000 gallons. One subsample was asked how much they would pay in higher prices to prevent 90% of the environmental damage from spills of 50,000 gallons or less. The other subsample was asked how much they would pay to prevent 90% of the damage from spills under 50,000 gallons and 75% of the damage from larger spills. 34 The scenario relies primarily on citing "experts" who "think" that the programs will prevent the specified percentage of the spills.
In what follows we present the findings of a new experiment which offers a clear test of the component insensitivity hypothesis. It comes from a contingent valua tion study [19] conducted by the Australian Resource Assessment Commission to measure willingness to pay to prevent possible injuries from a large proposed open pit mine in the Kakadu Conservation Zone, an area surrounded by the Kakadu National Park, one of Australia's two major national parks. Substantial effort was put into identifying and addressing potential sources of confusion and bias prior to fielding the CV instrument. The good that was valued, preservation of some of the amenities provided by the Kakadu National Park in Australia, is likely to provide mostly passive use values for most of the respondents since they live far away from the park but are aware of its reputation as one of Australia's premiere national parks.
Kakadu Conservation Zone Study
The policy issue under consideration was whether the conservation zone should be added to the Park to protect the area from the harm that might be caused by mining or whether mining should be allowed to proceed. The large resources that are necessary to conduct split-sample experiments of this magnitude were commit ted in this case because policy makers needed to know the value of different levels of this good. A national sample of Australian households was selected according to a multistage design. Two thousand in-person interviews lasting an average of 30 minutes were conducted by professional interviewers from one of Australia's major survey research firms.
The decision to use a split-sample design suitable to test the sensitivity hypothe sis was made for policy purposes rather than for the sake of conducting a methodological experiment. The commission knew from submissions by interested parties and a series of public hearings held around the country that the likely impact the mine would have on and off the site was a matter of considerable scientific and political debate and that the use of a single scenario would be of limited use if the impacts it presented were later shown substantially different from the commission's final assessment of the actual impacts. For this reason, two scenarios were developed-a minor impact scenario and a major impact scenario. 35 The basic facts underlying the scenarios were drawn in large part from the environmental impact statement prepared on behalf of the mining companies involved. The major interest groups on both sides of the issue were consulted on the wording of the scenarios: one of the scenarios tilted toward the mining industry's view of the risk and the other toward the environmental groups' view of the risk.36 With the exception of the variation in the degree and location of impact and risk of occurrence, the survey instruments were identical.
The questionnaire began by asking the respondents their views about several types of nonenvironmental problems followed by several environmental attitudinal measures (including a question that posed a trade-off between protecting the Australian environment or developing its economy). Then respondents were asked 35 The scenarios were not described as "major'" or "minor" to the respondents. These terms are used here as a convenient label for the two scenarios .
. l6 See Imber et al. [19] and Australian Resource Assessment Commission [2] for details. Neither interest group was completely happy with the characterization made of their position.
a series of questions about their awareness of and their experience with the Kakadu National Park. Maps, photographs, and artist renderings were used to convey basic background information such as the Parks and conservation zone's size, location, and characteristics. The respondents were also told about previous mining and other resource use activities in the area.
The next portion of the interview described the impact scenario and showed respondents an artist's rendering of what the proposed mine would look like. Four types of environmental effects were highlighted: (1) mine-related traffic, (2) chemi cals used to extract minerals, (3) mine process water, waste rock material, and (4) impact on wildlife. The difference between the major and minor impact scenarios was the degree of risk of off-site environmental damage. In the minor impact scenario respondents were informed:
While there would be some toxic chemicals used in the mining process, these chemicals would pose little risk to the environme nt. This is bec aus e enviro nmental controls ba sed on best practicable technology would be used. A range of stringent measures and safefguards will be taken to ensure that storage and on-site disposssal of toxic subs tances is stric tly controlled.
The parallel information in the major impact scenario states:
Th e use of toxic chemicals, mainly cyanide, hydrochloric ac id, and lime, in the mining process poses a small risk to the environment. Although env iro nmental controls based on best practicable technology and a range of stringent measures and safeguards would be used, there is alw ays a small chance of an acci dent . Any such accident could harm plants and anim als that live clos e to or well away fr om the mine.
The next paragraph in both scenarios began with a sentence elaborating on the safeguards: "The water storage arrangements for the proposed mine are designed to allow natural decontamination and prevent release of water and chemicals used in the mining process." The possibility of a toxic leak centered on the tailings pond and differed between the two scenarios.
The major impact scenario presented a photograph depicting one of the more important ecological areas that might be at risk from the mining activities. The major impact scenario also told respondents that "It's possible that the mine could upset the natural balance of Kakadu National Park. The mere existence of the mine could spoil the natural value of Kakadu National Park."
The Kakadu survey used a double-bounded discrete choice elicitation frame work in the context of a referendum.37 Respondents were randomly assigned to different monetary amounts as well as to the major or minor impact scenario. The monetary amounts used were chosen to a large degree to facilitate comparison with the value of mining outputs but were adjusted upward somewhat on the basis of pretest results. The payment vehicle was a reduction in take-home pay.
A test of the component insensitivity hypothesis is whether respondents who were asked about the major impact scenario give higher WTP amounts to prevent the mine than those who were presented with the minor impact scenario. The component insensitivity hypothesis can be tested nonparametrically by fitting the Peto-Turnbull version [36) of the Kaplan-Meier estimator to the combined major and minor impact scenarios data set and to the data from each of the two scenarios 37 See Nelso n (30] distribution with four degrees of freedom under the null, again indicating rejection of the null at the 0.01 level. Fitting a parametric distribution allows one to obtain a smooth curve rather than simply a step-function as in the non-parametric approach. Parametric tests based upon Weibull, log-normal, log-logistic, and normal likelihood functions all also reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level, using both willingness to pay responses and only the fi rst response. Fitting a Weibull distribution to the data (Table III) In assessing the quality of any study it is useful to consider whether the willingness-to-pay amounts can be predicted by using the covariates available in 38 Th e data for a sep arate and sm all er sample from th e Northern Territory (NT) where the Kakadu National Park is located suggests no diffe rence in will ingness to pay betw een the major and minor risk sc enario. Th is fi ndi ng is not su rp r ising gi ven the extensive news coverage and political debate ov er the mine proposal wh ich took place in the Northern Territories. The natu re of the two scenarios was such that neither was likely to directly contradict prior information held by NT resp ondents and neither contained information wh ich directly contr adicted the oth er. Consistent with large differences between the two sampl es in the distribution of most of the key covariate, the WTP estimates for the NT sample are on av erage small er. The NT sampl e, however, al so has a clear bimodal WTP distribution. Th is is al so consistent with the dist ribution of covariates valu es in the NT sample and the perception th at som e NT residents would directly gain financi al ly from the mine while som e would lose. Fie. 1. Willingness to pay for Ka kadu Conservation Zone.
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the survey. Here, parameterizing the location coefficient in the Weibull survival model, it can be shown that income, concern over aboriginal issues related to the park, feeling that mining within a national park reduces it value, desiring the government to provide more parks, visiting parks, and engaging in conservation behavior are all positively (and significantly) related to willingness to pay. Concern over jobs from mining, belief that risk from mining activities in general was low, belief that consideration of financial benefits to the country is important in making natural resource decisions, and age are all negatively (and significantly) related to willingness to pay. An indicator variable for the scenario the respondent received remains a significant predictor of willingness to pay. In contrast, studies showing a lack of scope effects (e. g., Desvousges et al. (11] ) typically show little ability to predict respondent willingness to pay. The Australian Kakadu data clearly reject the component insensitivity hypothe sis, and therefore, challenge the strong assertions Kahneman and Knetsch (21] and others (15] make about the fundamental inability of respondents in a contingent valuation survey to take into account the characteristics of the good they are asked to value. We should note though that greater resources were available to design and conduct this study than is the case for many CV studies. This made it possible, for example, to use in-person interviews and extensive visual aids. It is possible that CV studies conducted under tighter budgets would find it more difficult to demonstrate component sensitivity.
A search of recent CV literature finds a number of other studies which conduct split-sample comparisons that can be shown to be component sensitivity tests. These studies vary in the techniques used and valued a wide variety of goods including some whose total value is likely to be derived mostly from direct use and others whose total value is likely to be attributable to mostly passive use considera tions. Among those that clearly demonstrate a significant scope effect in one or more comparisons are the Boyle, et al. (4] 
CONCLUSION
A major source of confusion in the embedding debate has been the indiscrimi nate use of the term embedding to describe issues or findings that relate to completely different types of relationships. To clarify the linkage between embed ding and the economic theory governing consumer behavior, we have proposed an analytical framework based on the concepts of nesting and sequencing. By classify ing the relationships that multiple goods can have, the framework should help facilitate systematic testing of hypotheses that follow from the interrelationships between public goods. Of course the relevance of this framework is not limited to CV analyses. In principal these tests of sequencing and nesting properties can also be applied to revealed preference studies of multiple public goods.
A number of the tests described, including the component sensitivity test, may be useful in assessing the validity of a particular CV study. These tests can serve as useful diagnostic tools in the design phase of a contingent valuation study and may help researchers determine whether respondents are focusing on a CV scenario's key features. In order to enhance testing efficiency, we devote considerable attention to the development of criteria for a well-designed CV component sensitivity test. The criteria we recommend include: (1) careful attention to potential amenity misspecifications, (2) the use of a plausible market scenario, (3) a mode of survey administration that promotes respondent cooperation and atten tion, (4) the choice of nested goods whose differences are meaningful to respon dents, and (5) a sample large enough to reject reasonable differences. These criteria are consistent with the methodological guidelines the NOAA Panel [1] proposed to address the "embedding problem" and other possible weaknesses of the CV method.
Conducting a single-component sensitivity test cannot, however, test the validity of the method. This follows from the realization that failure to reject the hypothe sis of component insensitivity may simply be the failure of respondents to interpret the particular scenario as researchers intended. To evaluate the credibility of the claims of CV critics [11, 12, 21] , it is desirable to consider evidence from as wide a variety of contingent valuation studies as possible. If lack of sensitivity to scope is an unavoidable problem with the method per se, there should be wide-spread failure to reject the component insensitivity hypothesis. Evidence from the Kakadu study presented here, as well that from a number of other recent studies, suggests otherwise. Such a judgement, should it prove to be robust, should not be taken as license to ignore the ever present threat of amenity misspecification biases. Research efforts can profitably be directed toward helping to understand the conditions under which these biases are likely or not likely to occur.
